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Introduction: Paradigms,
Theism, and the
Parity Thesis

Few claims are more controversial than that beliefs about God
are rational. Challenges to theism are many and diverse, ranging
from the problem of evil to the meaninglessness of theistic ut
terances. Given this healthy and robust religious skepticism, it is
somewhat surprising and refreshing to discover philosophers who
claim that beliefs about God are not only rational but just as ratio
nal as many nontheistic beliefs that nearly everyone accepts as ob
viously rational. In short, they argue for a kind of epistemic parity
between theistic and nontheistic beliefs.
Perhaps this claim is less surprising in light of twentieth-century
developments in epistemology, philosophy of science, and other
related fields. The profound difficulty of spelling out the rationality
of scientific claims and theories is by now well known among phi
losophers. Not only are scientific claims difficult to pin down vis
a-vis rationality, but the notion of rationality is itself, to understate
the point, less than obviously clear. In fact, it is considered vital
these days to spell out what is meant by the term "rational" before
discussing whether a given belief is rational. Since my topic is the
rationality of belief in God, I should be, accordingly, expected to
do just that. Nevertheless, although I am prepared to point toward
the neighborhoods in which to find the notions of rationality that
are my concern here, I do not provide detailed directions at this
early stage. There are two reasons to be reticent. First, the neigh-

2]

Rationality and Theistic Belief

borhoods are crowded and not well lit. Second, the work of the
philosophical mapmakers in this area is work in progress; many
concepts of rationality are currently being explored, and the two
philosophers on whom I concentrate-William P. Alston and Al
vin Plantinga-are directly in the thick of these explorations. Since
in this essay I consider, as well as extend, the thought of two
working epistemologists, it is important to note that their thinking
on these topics has developed over several years. In short, any map
of the neighborhoods will be quite complex, and thus to point at
this juncture to details would be to run ahead without preparation
into the dark. It is better to let the details unfold as we proceed. Be
that as it may, maps start out only as sketches, and thus it serves us
well if some account of the parity thesis can be given, leaving the
details of description until needed.
I.

The Parity Thesis and Epistemic Status

As noted, some philosophers claim that theistic beliefs (viz. , be
liefs about God or his activity) are as epistemically viable as com
monly held nontheistic beliefs. I call this claim the "parity thesis":
Parity Thesis1 (PT1): Theistic beliefs have the same epi
stemic status as commonly held but obviously rational
nontheistic beliefs.
There are many questions to ask about PT 1• What is epistemic sta
tus? What is rational belief? Which theistic beliefs have the sug
gested status? which nontheistic beliefs? For example, is the belief
that God loves me, formed under conditions often considered ad
verse to the truth of that belief-say, having experiences of great
evil-just as epistemically viable as the belief that I see a computer
while I am looking at a computer and other conditions are normal?
The first issue to note is a point now widely accepted among epis
temologists. The applicability of epistemic notions is context-de
pendent. Thus, any version of the parity thesis must be tied to
specific conditions. So:
Parity Thesis2 (PT 2): Under appropriate conditions, a
theistic belief (of a certain kind) has the same epistemic
status as a nontheistic belief (of a certain kind),
where the "certain kinds" must be specified.
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What does it mean to say that two beliefs have the same epi
stemic status? Alston describes what he calls the "epistemic point
of view. " He writes that "that point of view is defined by the aim
of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of be
liefs, " where the qualification about a "large body of beliefs" is
added in order to avoid reaching the aim simply by believing only
what is obviously true. 1 In regard to the epistemic point of view,
there are many important notions that range, on the positive side,
from certainty through knowledge to (something like the inele
gantly stated) not deontologically unacceptable, with many rungs
on the ladder in between. 2 To discover the many related notions,
and understandings of those notions, one can begin considering
philosophers (standing in a long tradition) who think knowledge is
justified true belief. Depending on whom one reads, justification is
understood as anything from epistemic dutifulness to reliability or
coherence. And rationality can be understood as what Plantinga
calls "Foley rationality" after Richard Foley's account in The The
ory of Epistemic Rationality in which rationality is aligned with ac
tion aimed at some goal. 3 Or it can be understood as a deontologi
cal notion dealing with one's noetic duty. As well, rationality can
be thought of in terms of noetic virtue. Finally, some epistemol
ogists use the term warrant. Plantinga, for example, separates
warrant or positive epistemic status (that thing, enough of which,
along with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge) from justifica
tion because the latter term suggests "duty, obligation, permission,
and rights-the whole deontological stable. "4 And, he notes, the
L William P. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," in Alston, Epi
stemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer
sity Press, 1989), p. 83; originally in Monist 68 (1985): 57-89.

2. Two points need to be mentioned here. First, perhaps the ladder metaphor
is misleading, unless the ladder is more like a rope web with connections in all
directions. The notions of rationality, epistemic justification, warrant, and truth
are connected in many ways and not in any neat or obvious fashion. See Alston,
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," and Alvin Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic
Status and Proper Function,"

Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 1-50. Second, I say

"positive," for one might say that there is a range of negative epistemic notions as
well. For example, there is Roderick Chisholm's notion of withholding judgment,
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vard University Press, 1987).

e specified.

4. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," p. 3- Plantinga
most fully makes the distinction between warrant and justification in Warrant: The

n

as well as all the notions surrounding what is
3. Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic

irrational to believe.
Rationality (Cambridge, Mass.: Har
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latter notions do not play a direct role in knowledge at all. In
somewhat the same vein, but for different reasons, Alston argues
that justification is not necessary for knowledge. 5 The important
point is that there is no single nor even a mere handful of central
epistemic notions.
Given that epistemic notions are so disparate, one should won
der how the parity thesis, as described above, is to be understood.
It is difficult to give a general but interesting version of the thesis;
it is better to evaluate detailed and specific versions. But this makes
matters complex, for there are perhaps as many detailed versions as
there are understandings of epistemic notions. As first steps toward
spelling out at least some of these more specific versions, consider
that PT2 remains open in at least three ways: (1). It remains open
with regard to the exact nature of epistemic status. For example, is
it a normative notion or a truth-conducive notion, and, if it is nor
mative, how are we to understand the nature of the normative
account? (2). It remains open with regard to various epistemic fea
tures beliefs falling under it might have. For example, even though
two beliefs might have the same epistemic status with regard to a
normative, permissive justification, they need not have the same
status in terms of other features necessary for knowledge-say,
Plantinga's notion of warrant-or, perhaps, in terms of other kinds
of justification-say, a truth-conducive kind (where a beliefs being
justified comes to something like "more probably true than false"
or perhaps "at least likely to be true"). (3). It remains open not
only with regard to the kind of epistemic status but to the level or
strength of that status. Given, for example, that two beliefs have a
certain kind of truth-conducive justification, one may have more
of that kind of justification than the other. So, although both are
justified, one is more probably true than the other.
Perhaps to close at least this last bit of open-endedness, the parity thesis is best stated in this way:
Parity Thesis3 (PT 3): Under appropriate conditions, a
theistic belief (of a certain specified kind) has at least the
same kind and level of epistemic status as a nontheistic
belief (of a certain specified kind).
Current Debate, and Warrant and Proper Function (both New York: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1992).
5. See Alston, "Justification and Knowledge," in

Epistemic Justification.
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But since it is not just beliefs with which epistemologists are con
cerned but also the practices that generate them and the people
who form the beliefs and follow the practices, the final general
account of the parity thesis is this:
Parity Thesis: Under appropriate conditions, ( 1) S's en
gaging in an epistemic practice EP, which generates theis
tic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (2) S's believing that p,
where p is a theistic belief (of a specified kind), has the
same level and (specified) kind of epistemic status as (3 )
S's engaging in an epistemic practice EP*, which gener
ates nontheistic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (4) S's be
lieving that p*, where p* is a nontheistic belief (of a spec
ified kind).
This is a very general claim. In order that the parity thesis have
some epistemological teeth, the practices or beliefs on both the
theistic and nontheistic sides of the balance need to be specified and
described in more detail. For example, suppose the thesis claimed
something like this:
Parity Thesissense perceptual: Under appropriate conditions,
theistic beliefs about God's presence in my life and the
practices that generate them have the same level of deon
tological epistemic justification as sense perceptual beliefs
and the practices that generate them.
Although one might wish for more specificity yet (e. g. , what are
the appropriate conditions, what exactly is deontological justifica
tion, and what are the inner workings of sense perception and the
theistic belief-forming practice?), at least this version has some bite
and, in fact, is a claim with which many-theists and nontheists
alike-might disagree. It is clear that one cannot decide on the
truth of the parity thesis unless specific versions are laid out for
inspection.
I believe, however, that the general version of the parity thesis
captures something of the spirit of the work of both Plantinga and
Alston and, more generally, of the position sometimes called Re
formed epistemology. This is a self-descriptive term used by some
philosophers associated in one way or another with Calvin College
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and the Reformed tradition in Christian theology. 6 Plantinga and
Nicholas Wolterstorff are two central figures of this group. Alston,
another central figure, is not of Reformed theological background,
at least in the same sense. He has, nevertheless, worked extensively
with Plantinga and Wolterstorff on the epistemology of religion.
For ease of discussion, I simply baptize Alston a Reformed epis
temologist. Although I believe each of the Reformed epistemolo
gists would agree (or would have agreed, given some of their writ
ings) in spirit with the parity thesis, each of them has a different
picture of which theistic beliefs (or practices) and nontheistic beliefs
(or practices) have epistemic parity. As noted, I focus here on the
work of Plantinga and Alston. I take their work as normative of
the approach of Reformed epistemology. 7

2. Paradigms of Rational Belief
If one ignores the claims of global skepticism by turning one's
philosophical back on the skeptic, certain kinds of beliefs emerge as
paradigms of rationally held beliefs-beliefs about medium-sized
physical objects, for example. Indeed, Alston takes such beliefs to
be central when he concentrates on what he calls "perceptual prac
tice" (PP) and its deliverances as paradigmatically rational. 8 It is
rational, he admits, to believe that there is a tree in front of me
only under certain conditions, for example, when the lighting is
sufficient or when my perceptual faculties are operating normally.
But given these conditions, many physical object beliefs-specifi
cally those we form using sense perception and its related epistemic
practices-are paradigm cases of rational beliefs. 9 Alston also pro6. There appears to be no necessary connection between the epistemological
accounts developed by the Reformed epistemologists and the theological tradition
with which they have been identified.
7· Another way to think of Reformed epistemology is to note its reliance on,
and use of, the work of Thomas Reid. All these philosophers, Plantinga, Alston,
and Wolterstorff, appeal at various points to Reid's work.
8. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," in Faith and Ratio
nality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (No
tre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
9. The phrase "physical object beliefs" is much broader than the phrase "per
ceptual beliefs." But many of our physical object beliefs result from the use of our
perceptual capacities. My concern is with physical object beliefs taken in the nar-
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vides a detailed account of the nature of the rationality qua justi
fication he has in mind. Even without considering those details,
one can see clearly, given his comparison of perceptual and theistic
beliefs and practices, that Alston has held some version of the par
ity thesis in several works. 10
Plantinga likewise is concerned with certain paradigm cases of
rational belief He includes cases of perceptual belief such as that I
now see a tree (when I am looking at one), but his range of admis
sible beliefs is larger than simply the set of sense perceptual beliefs.
He suggests that it is perfectly rational to believe that that person is
in pain (when she is writhing in pain before us) and that I remem
ber eating breakfast this morning (when it seems to me that I re
member eating breakfast). Here we see Plantinga's willingness to
include in the set of paradigmatically rational beliefs two other
kinds of belief often held to be problematic for human ratio
nality-memory beliefs and beliefs about other minds. This inclu
sivism, long characteristic of Plantinga's work, is indicative of the
spirit of the Reformed epistemologists.11 Both Alston and Plantinga
have appealed to fairly weak notions of rationality: Alston appeals
to weak, normative justification, Plantinga to proper basicality,
where this notion is to be understood within a normative account
of rationality in which one is permitted to believe, or where one is
within one's rights in believing, a proposition.12 Thus, the parity
thesis emerges.
In the broader work of Alston and Plantinga there are variations
on this theme. The work of Plantinga since about 1986 concen
trates on what he calls "warrant" -as Plantinga says, that thing,
enough of which, along with true belief, gives humans knowledge.
And Alston is well known for his work in general epistemology.
Nevertheless, Plantinga's work on epistemology from about 1979
rower sense of those delivered by perception. Unless a cleaner distinction is called
for, I do not make it.
IO. He moves away from this position in Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemol
ogy of Religious Experience (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). I have
more to say about this in Chapter 8.

I r. See, for example, Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational
Justification of Belief in God (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967).
12. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," and Plantinga,
"Reason and Belief in God," both in Faith and Rationality.
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through I986 is concerned to evaluate the charge that one cannot
rationally hold theistic beliefs since such beliefs are supposed to be
noetically deficient, whereas perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs,
and beliefs about other minds are not. And in several essays Alston
considers both normative and evaluative accounts of justification
where he appears not to be concerned about knowledge per se. I
use these earlier works, where various accounts of the parity thesis
emerge, as a springboard for a broader discussion that includes
consideration of later developments.
It seems fair to say, overall, that Alston and Plantinga point to
three pivotal kinds of belief as paradigms of rational belief: (percep
tually delivered) physical object beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs
about other minds. To facilitate discussion in the remaining pages,
let us take the following as examples of members of the set of
paradigm rational beliefs.

(I) . A tree is there.
(2). That person is in pain.
(J). I ate breakfast this morning.
When I refer to the paradigm beliefs, I have these examples in
mind, although they are simply representative of the set of para
digmatically rational beliefs more broadly construed as the sets
of (perceptually delivered) physical object beliefs, memory beliefs,
and beliefs about other minds.
Given these examples, the parity thesis has the following appli
cation. The beliefs that
(4). God created the world.
(5). God created the flower that is before me.
(6). God forgives my sin.
have the same level and kind of epistemic status as (I), (2), and (J).
Of course, the kind must be specified, and one must leave open the
possibility that other kinds of epistemic status may accrue to either
theistic or paradigm beliefs while not accruing to the others. The
strongest versions of the parity thesis have it that theistic and para
digm beliefs have exactly the same kind and level of epistemic sta-
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tus and that that level and kind are the best (or strongest) kind of
justification available.13 But the central point is that any skepticism
with regard to the specific kind of justification laid at the feet of the
paradigm beliefs is a skepticism to be laid at the feet of the theistic
beliefs, and vice versa. I do not mean to claim, and neither does
Plantinga or Alston, that there are no differences among (1), (2),
and (3) or among (4), (5), and (6). The point is rather that the
general kinds of consideration that go into providing the ratio
nality of the paradigm beliefs also go into providing the rationality
of theistic beliefs, and vice versa.

3. Goals
If the parity thesis captures a central claim of Reformed epis
temology, then Reformed epistemology puts forth an intriguing
claim. That theistic beliefs may have the same epistemic status as
other more commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs is a suggestion
many theists would surely welcome. But do theistic beliefs have
such a status? My overarching goal is to argue that, strictly speak
ing, none of the versions of the parity thesis attributable to Alston
or Plantinga is successful. Each one fails because of a lack of recog
nition of the necessary role of an epistemic base-a set of back
ground beliefs-in the formation and justification of certain kinds
of belie( But I do wish to defend, and work within, the general
spirit of the Reformed epistemological frame work. Insofar as I
have success in the latter task, this is an essay in Reformed epis
temology (i.e., in its spirit) rather than an essay on Reformed epis
temology (i.e., critical of it). Insofar as I have success in the for
mer, this is also an essay on Reformed epistemology.
My aims fall into three categories. First, I wish to contribute to
the ongoing discussion of the rationality of belief in God, for much
disagreement about it remains. It does seem to a great many phi
losophers of religion that belief in God is rational. I throw in my
lot with these. But there is disagreement among philosophers of
religion not only about whether theistic belief is rational but also
IJ. It should be noted that what counts as best may need analysis. One might
ask, best for what-truth, living a peaceful life, being happy?

9
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about how it is rational. I hope to add at least a modicum of insight
into this latter debate.
My second area of concern is to provide an account and analysis
of various versions of the parity thesis and related suggestions aris
ing out of Reformed epistemology. The claims of Alston and Plan
tinga are my focus, and I present some criticisms of the positions
of each. I believe these criticisms raise some difficult, and overlap
ping, challenges to each of their more or less explicit versions of
the thesis, in particular where epistemic parity is said to exist be
tween sense perception and theistic epistemic practices. But there
are also problems when some of their more recent work is applied
to other versions of the parity thesis, versions that I construct
based on their fundamental strategies. I explore these as well.
I weigh Alston's and Plantinga's various parity theses and find
them wanting. In particular, their accounts of theistic experience
and the epistemic practices that generate theistic belief need refin
ing. Once this is done, the third aim can be fulfilled: to suggest and
defend a version of the parity thesis that does not fall prey to the
criticisms laid against the theses suggested by Alston and Plan
tinga. As well, I draw several important parallels between the two
practices to which this new parity thesis calls attention. Hence, I
attempt to make a positive case for the plausibility of the parity
thesis thus understood. Overall, then, I hope to clarify and defend
the project of Reformed epistemology. 14
14. There are two respects in which I am hesitant to characterize my position as
Reformed. The first is that both Alston and Plantinga take foundationalist posi
tions in their epistemological theories. As becomes clear, I am less sanguine about
foundationalism than either Alston or Plantinga. But Wolterstorffs position is not
(or at least not clearly) foundationalist, and so perhaps my position is not ill-de
scribed as Reformed. Second, both Plantinga and Alston are unabashed metaphysi
cal realists. Since my philosophical youth, I too have been so unabashed. In (what I
hope is only) my early mid-life, I have become unsure of this position. (Do philos
ophers qua philosophers have mid-life crises?) But I need not commit myself to
one position or the other here, since much of what I say is, I believe, compatible
with a metaphysical realist position. Whether or not one's being a metaphysical
realist is a necessary condition of being epistemologically Reformed is not an issue
I enter here.

